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Abstract: The reason structure-perform ance relationships are
sensitive to  the modelling of price or quantity as a decision variable 
is because of the consequences of the choice of decision variable for 
slope of the residual demand curve along which an individual firm 
maximizes profit. When one models profit maximization along a 
residual demand curve directly, important results of the literature on 
p rice-se tting  and quan tity -se tting  firms (such as the impact of 
product differentiation on market efficiency or the private 
























































































































































































Since Bertrand (1883) reviewed Coumot (1838), it has been 
understood th a t structure-perform ance relationships in oligopoly 
differ fundamentally depending on a particular kind of conduct: 
w hether firms se t price or quantity as a decision variable. The 
difference is most startling  when the product is homogeneous, but that 
the difference is essential even if products are differentiated 
underlies many recent contributions to  the lite ra tu re .1
Yet it is odd th a t th is should be so. We know, for example, th a t 
market performance under monopoly is invariant to  changes in the 
firm's decision variable. Accepting the fact th a t 1 is a special 
number, what is it  about the move from 1 incumbent to  2 th a t endows 
the price-quantity  distinction w ith such importance?
In th is paper, I argue th a t it  is not the choice of the firm's 
decision variable th a t is of fundamental importance to  the nature of 
structure-perform ance relationships in oligopoly. What is critical is 
not the firm's decision variable but what it thinks other firms' 
decision variables are. This in turn is important because it 
determines the nature of the firm's perceived residual demand curve.
Finally, I argue th a t if what is critical for s tru c tu re - 
performance relationships is the nature of the firm's residual demand 
curve, then industrial economists ought to  model the residual demand 
curve directly. By way of illustration, I apply a residual demand 
curve model of oligopoly to  two of the standard questions of th is
1. For example, Vives (1984), Singh and Vives (1984), Deneckere and 




























































































literature: the impact of product differentiation on market
efficiency and the impact of an exogenous merger on firm 
profitability.
II. Prices, quantities, and the residual demand curve
Consider a standard duopoly model. The product
differentiated, and inverse demand curves are linear:
(la) Pi * a - (qt * 0q2)
(lb) P2 = a -  (0q] * V
8 is a product differentiation parameter, w ith 0 s 0 £ 1. If 8 = 0, 
the products of the two firms are independent in demand. As 0 
approaches one, the products of the two firms become b e tte r and b e tte r 
substitu tes .2 For simplicity, assume th a t marginal cost is constant, 
and w ithout loss of generality assume th a t marginal cost is zero.
By inverting the system  of inverse demand curves, one obtains the 
demand equations
(2a) (1 - 02)q, -  Cl -  6)a - 0p2 - p,
(2b) (1 - 02)q2 = (1 -  0)a «• Spj -  p2 .
(1) and (2) hold provided all prices and quantities are nonnegative, 
which is henceforth assumed.
The usual procedure to  obtain firm l ’s quantity reaction curve is 
to  substitu te  (la )  in the definition of firm l ’s profit, 7ij -  p q  to  
express firm X's profit in terms of quantity alone. This procedure 
makes it natural to  emphasize the role of quantity as a choice
2. In a N-firm oligopoly model presented below, I allow 0 < 0. which 




























































































variable in determination of the nature of equilibrium. Suppose 
instead we adopt the equivalent formulation of treating  firm 1 as 
maximizing profit p)q( choosing both price and quantity, subject to  (la ) 
as a constraint. This problem is analyzed by maximizing the 
Lagrangian
(3) £  = p ^  * X(a -  q, -  0q2 -  p^
w ith respect to  p , q^ and X.
The first-o rder conditions th a t characterize an interior solution 
to  (3) are
(4a) ^  - <1, -  K -  0.
(4b) -  p, -  X - 0.
(4c) > a - q, -  0q2 - Pj = 0.
But these conditions together imply
(5) P, -  a -  q, -  0q2 - X -  q( ,
and th is leads directly to  the usual Cournot quan tity -se tting  reaction 
function when products are differentiated.
By going through the same so rt of exercise for firm 2, one 
obtains a quantity reaction function for firm 2. The two reaction 
functions together imply the usual equilibrium for quan tity -se tting  
firms, w ith the usual properties. But in th is formulation of the 
model, firms are not quantity se tte rs . They are profit-maximizers 
th a t believe their rivals hold quantity constant.
Now turn to  what by abuse of terminology might be called the dual 
problem: maximize p ^  subject to  (2a) as a constraint. The 
corresponding Lagrangian is
(6) *  - ptqj ♦ mIU -  0)a ♦ 0p2 - (1 -  02)qj -  p^ , 




























































































(7a) • 1 , -  M - 0
(7b) - P, * U -  02)m * 0
(7c) - Cl - 6)a ♦ 6pz - ( 1  - e2)q, -  p, - 0 .
From these first-o rder conditions, we have
p, - Cl - 0)a » 0p2 - Cl - 02)qJ
(8)
- ( 1  - 0)a ♦ 0p2 - (1 - 02)p - (1 - 0)a ♦ 0p, -  ,
and th is leads directly to  the usual equation of a price reaction 
curve when products are differentiated:
(9) 2p( - (1 -  0)a -  0p2 .
By going through the same exercise for firm 2, one obtains the 
equation of the o ther price reaction curve. The two equations 
together imply the usual equilibrium for p rice-se tting  firms, w ith the 
usual properties. But in th is formulation of the model, firms are not 
p rice-se tte rs . They are profit-maximizers th a t believe their rivals 
hold price constant.




























































































If it is not firm l 's  decision variable th a t determines the 
nature of its  reaction curve, what is it?  I t is firm l 's  beliefs 
•bout th« way its  rival acts , which in turn determines the slope of 
firm l 's  perceived residual demand curve.
Suppose firm 1 is a t a point (q^p^ which is on the demand 
surface for the two varieties. If firm 1 believes th a t firm 2 holds 
q2 constant, it a c ts  in the belief th a t its  residual inverse demand 
curve has equation (la )  and slope -  1 (figure 1). But if firm 1 
believes th a t firm 2 holds p2 constant, it a c ts  in the belief th a t its
residual inverse demand curve has equation (2a) and slope - (1 - 82).
The residual inverse demand curve of the duopolist th a t faces a 
p rice-se tting  rival is fla tte r-h a s  a slope th a t is smaller in absolute 
value-than the residual inverse demand curve of the duopolist th a t 
faces or believes it faces a quan tity -se tting  rival. It is th is 
difference in slope-not w hether a firm is modelled as selecting price 
or quan tity -tha t determines the nature of structure-perform ance 
relationships.
III. Down the residual demand curve w ith gun and camera3
Models of price- and quan tity -setting  behavior differ because 
they imply th a t firms move along different residual demand curves.
But if it is the nature of the residual demand curve th a t determines 
the nature of oligopoly equilibrium, why should industrial economists 
confine their a tten tion  to  a choice between the two alternative




























































































residual demand curves implied by the beliefs th a t rivals hold either 
price or quantity fixed? Why not model the relationship between 
oligopoly equilibrium and the residual demand curve directly?
A. A residual demand curve duopoly model
I model firm i as maximizing profit along a a residual inverse 
demand curve w ith slope - a,
(10) P, * A, -  aq ( ,
for a > 0 and for i -  1, 2.4 For a given residual demand curve, it 
makes no difference w hether firm i is thought of as picking price or 
quantity: its  profit-maximizing price, output pair will be the same 
under e ither specification.
Solution concept
What conditions should we require of equilibrium price-output 
pairs Cq^Pj) and (q2,p2)?
In standard oligopoly models, a firm's noncooperative equilibrium 
play maximizes its  payoff, given the actions of all o ther firms. In 
addition, and independently of w hether firms se t prices or quantities, 
equilibrium prices and quantities clear the market. If firms set 
quantities, equilibrium prices are the prices firms expect to  see for 
those quantities. If firms se t price, equilibrium outputs are the 
quantities firms expect to  sell a t those prices.
For a residual demand curve oligopoly model, the corresponding 
requirements are th a t q ( are maximize
(11) 71, =■ (A, -  «q()qi
for i -  1, 2 and th a t (<!,.[>,) and (<i2.P2) and be on the true demand
4. In a more general model, the slope param eter a would be allowed 




























































































surface, given by (1) or (2).
In the context of the model developed here, th is  is neither more 
nor less than the familiar concept of noncooperative equilibrium, of 
which it  shares the streng ths and weaknesses (for a discussion, see 
Johansen (1982)). If these conditions are satisfied, each firm is 
maximizing i ts  expected payoff, and equilibrium values of price and 
output are consistent w ith the each firm's beliefs about price-output 
relationships. This Justifies thinking of price-output combinations 
th a t sa tisfy  these conditions as a noncooperative equilibrium.
Duopoly equilibrium
If q ( is to maximize (11), it  must be th a t q( -  A |/2a, or th a t 
A, -  2 aq ). Thus if (q(,p^ is to  be optimal for firm i, 
the  equation of firm i's perceived residua! demand curve can be 
w ritten
(12) p, -  2 aq t -  aq t ,
from which
for i -  1. 2.
The o ther requirement of equilibrium is th a t the combinations 




(14a) p, - “q, - a - q, - 0q2
p2 -  “ q2 -  a - eq, -  q2 •
Solving (14a) and (14b) gives equilibrium outputs:
(15) % -  %  - 1 ♦ a •* 8




























































































P, -  P2 -  1 ♦ a  .  0 ■
If a -  1, these reduce to the Coumot equilibrium values. If a  - 
(1 - 0* 2 *), they become the Bertrand equilibrium values.5 
B. Produce differentiation and market performance
Singh and Vives (1984) show th a t the relative efficiency of 
quan tity -se tting  and p rice-se tting  competition depends on whether 
different varieties are substitu tes  or complements. I t is instructive 
to  examine the impact of demand relationships on market performance in 
the context of the present model.




1 ♦ a * (N - 1)8 
aa
(18)
P 1 - a  -  (N - 1)0 
A single firm's profit is therefore
l2 '[1 ♦ a » (N - 1)0]
New social welfare, the sum of consumers' surplus and firms’ profit, 
is
(19) NSW -  £j-(a ♦ p)q Na2 1 * 2a ♦ (N - 1)0
[1 (n -  n o r
Taking the derivative of NSW w ith respect to  a gives
(20) 1 3NSW Na2 3“
a
(i * o + (n - ner
From equation (17), if 0 > 0, the denominator on the right is 
positive and the entire expression on the right is negative. In th is 
model, increases in the slope of the residual demand curve worsen
5. If firm 2 maximizes profit along a residual demand curve of form 
(10), and firm 1 knows th is and ac ts  as a leader w ith respect to  firm
2, then firm 1 produces monopoly output. This is the usual




























































































market performance. In th is model, market performance is be tter, the 
fla tte r firms' perceived residual demand curves. (Recall th a t an
increase in a  from 1 -  02 to  1 corresponds to  a move from Bertrand 
to  Cournot oligopoly.)
IV. The private profitability of exogenous mergers
By way of illustrating the insights th a t are offered by the 
residual demand curve oligopoly model, I use it to  address the 
questions of the private profitability of exogenous mergers.
It will be recalled th a t Salant et al. (1983) have shown that 
exogenous mergers in Cournot models will often be privately 
unprofitable for the merging firms, unless the merger includes a very 
high percentage of firms in the industry. The immediate cause of the 
lack of profitability is the reaction of firms outside the merger to 
output restric tion  by the post-m erger firm. At a deeper level, it has 
been a ttribu ted  to  the fact th a t in Cournot models the post-m erger 
firm's output restric tion  is unrealistically extreme (Perry and 
Porter, 1985). When the product is standardized, all firms in the 
post-m erger Cournot market have the same equilibrium output.
Deneckere and Davidson (1985) have shown th a t exogenous mergers 
are privately profitable if firms se t price.6 Thus the exogenous 
merger literature is one of the areas where the price se tte r , quantity 
s e t te r  distinction appears to  be fundamental. But even more 
fundamental is the slope of the residual demand curve along which 
firms believe they are maximizing profit.





























































































(17a) and (17b) give equilibrium values for the N-firm residual 
demand curve model. For simplicity, let 6 * 1, so th a t products are 
homogeneous. Suppose M < N firms merge, and th a t the post-m erger firm 
maximizes
M M
(21) II -  y  (A, - a j q l q  .
l-l J-l
This specification Implies th a t the post-m erger firm understands 
demand relationships among the varieties it produces, but uses a 
perceived residual demand curve w ith slope -a  to  summarize demand
relationships w ith varieties produced by o ther firms.
If the vector (<},(}...... qM) is to  maximize (21), it  must be th a t
A, » 2a(q ♦ q ♦ ... * q ). This in turn implies th a t p =
1 1 2  M 1
a(q «■ q ... + q ) and th a t in equilibrium
(22) (1 - a)MqM - FqF - a ,
where qM is equilibrium output of one division of the post-m erger 
firm and q^ is equilibrium output of one of the F firms th a t stay  
outside the merger.
For a fringe firm, in equilibrium, the profit-maximization 
condition implies
(23) Mqw * (F - a)qr - a .
From (22) and (23), post-m erger equilibrium outputs are
(24a) qF * F ♦ 1 ♦ a
' 24W qM ‘  '
Observe th a t the residual demand curve model dem onstrates the 
same C heshire-cat effect of merger th a t occurs Salant e t al. (1983): 
the post-m erger firm has the same equilibrium output as firms outside 





























































































( 2 5 ) M (F + 1 + a)
C om paring (2 5 ) and th e  p re -m e rg e r  p ro f i t  of a  s in g le  firm, an 
e x eg v n eu *  m erg e r ie p r iv a te ly  p ro f i ta b le  if
(26) M a (F - a )2 .
Inequality (26) is more likely to  be satisfied, the smaller is 
a - th e  fla tte r the firm's perceived residual demand curve. This makes 
perfect economic sense. If a firm maximizes profit along a residual 
demand curve th a t is very flat, then by merging it internalizes the 
impacts of output decisions by firms th a t are believed to  be hard 
com petitors on its  own profitability. I t  is precisely when rivals are 
thought to  be hard com petitors th a t mergers ought to  be expected to  be 
profitable. That is what (26) implies.
If a  -  1, which is the Cournot residual demand case, then (26) 
is the condition for private profitability of an exogenous merger th a t 
arises in the Salant e t al. (1983) model. If firms se t price the 
residual demand curve is f la tte r than if firms se t prices, it is more 
likely th a t (26) will be satisfied  and therefore more likely th a t an 
exogenous merger will be profitable.7 This is consistent w ith the 
resu lts of Deneckere and Davidson (1985).






























































































Industrial economists have focused on the p rice -se tte r /q u an tity - 
se tte r  distinction as a fundamental determinant of market performance. 
I show in this paper th a t the reason structure-perform ance 
relationships are sensitive to  the use of price or quantity as a 
decision variable is because the choice of decision variables 
determines the slope of the residual demand curve along which an 
individual firm maximizes profit.
Whether a firm se ts  price or quantity is not of fundamental 
importance for structure-perform ance relationships. What is of 
fundamental importance is the slope of a firm's residual demand curve. 
When one models profit maximization along a residual demand curve 
directly, important resu lts of the literature  on p rice-se tting  and 
quan tity -se tting  firms (such as the impact of product differentiation 
on market efficiency or the private profitability of exogenous 
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